


**COLLECTIVIZATION IN KARAKALPAKSTAN AND ITS EFFECTS FOR AULS  
(VILLAGES)**

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**Summary**

The given article discusses the period of collectivization of Karakalpakstan in the late 20s and early 30s of the XX century. The nationalization of the region's resources, land and water policy, which did not give the expected result, but despite their inefficiency, the totalitarian government was increasingly gaining turnover. The reasons for all the failures were declared to be the prosperous population of the villages, bayi (richman), the clergy, mirabs, merchants and local authorities.

**Keywords:** war communism, collectivization, koshchi, kazu, belder, bai, ishan, arik-aksakal, belsendi, teperish, lumpen-proletariat, dehkans, Kazakh ASSR, Basmachism, vakf.

**Introduction**

With the establishment of Soviet power, the process of reforming the country began, despite their inefficiency, the totalitarian government was increasingly gaining momentum. The doctrine of "war communism" solved the tasks set, gradually changing the method of command and control. Its most pronounced forms appeared in agriculture. The stage of collectivization reorganized the country's agriculture and introduced fear and misunderstanding into the society of the villagers.

The objective of this article is to study the processes of introducing the collective method of managing agriculture, the impact of reforms on the socio-economic situation of the rural population of Karakalpakstan during the study period.

Attempts to implement land and water reform in the conditions of Karakalpakstan in 1925-1928 did not give the new government the expected results. Land management work gave them the opportunity to control the mass of landless dehkans, in whose mass consciousness they formed the image of the enemy in the person of large landowners and entrepreneurs as an important element of the "class struggle" through the media [1].

The ideological opposition in society intensified with the arrival of P.I. Varlamov [2], who in the fall of 1927 replaced Abu Kudabaev as the first secretary of the regional party organization. A letter from the Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (October 1927) addressed to P.I. Varlamov directly indicated with whom to fight: water use and land use ... then they must be combated with the help of appropriate reforms" [3].

What goals were set for the state bodies and public associations of Karakalpakstan in the late 1920s?



Firstly, the difficult crisis situation in the village and kishlak, which did not allow adequately solving the tasks facing the authorities, irritated and fettered the activity of the party authorities in order to establish full control over society and social processes.

Secondly, the economic influence of the wealthy strata in auls and villages is also determined by their ideological influence on other estates.

Thirdly, the development of agriculture and the creation of a profitable economy in the periphery, generating income for the benefit of the state, were necessary to strengthen the economic power of the industrial metropolis.

The authorities of Karakalpakstan petitioned the Regional Committee of Kazakhstan to postpone the land and water reform from the end of 1930 to the spring sowing campaign [4]. The bureau of the regional committee noted the presence of “fully achieved political training of the broad labor-poor and weak-middle peasant masses”, which gives grounds for achieving full awareness by the labor-poor stratum of the need for a unified action in a bloc with the middle peasant against the baystvo for a social class change in land and water relations in the village and kishlak.

However, on November 20, 1928, at a meeting of the secretaries of the district committees of the CPSU (b) and chairmen of the district executive committees with the participation of members of the Bureau of the regional party committee and party activists, where P. Varlamov chaired, Galeto made the main report "On the land and water reform in the KAO", who summarized opinions and results of activities in this area, said that “we cannot carry out the reform now, because a campaign is ahead - the purge of Koshchi, re-elections of the Soviets, the implementation of the “kazu” with new principles of taxation according to profitability, the sowing campaign” [5] the bureau of the regional committee noted the presence of “fully achieved political training of the broad labor-poor and weak-middle peasant masses”, which gives grounds for achieving full awareness by the labor-poor stratum of the need for a unified action in a bloc with the middle peasant against the baystvo for a social class change in land and water relations in the village and kishlak.

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The main direction of the offensive against the “semi-feudal-capitalist elements” of the auls and villages of Karakalpakstan was the struggle for the sovietization of water and “kazu”, which began in the spring of 1928 and ended in the autumn of 1929, because here was the main knot of socio-economic relations between the village and aul.

According to this reform, the main criterion - the allocation of "casuchi" depending on the size of the irrigated area was replaced by dependence on the size of the profitability of the farm. Namely, households with an annual income of less than 100 rubles were exempted from natural



duty. And farms with an income of 200 to 300 rubles put up one worker, wealthy and Baik farms with an income of up to 408 rubles put up two workers. Farms with a profitability of more than 400 rubles for every 100 rubles put up an additional worker, and with a profitability of 800 rubles or more, they put up 2 workers for every subsequent 100 rubles [7].

So, in the spring and autumn of 1928/1929. 15,939 people were attracted at the expense of the bay farms. Along with the beys, middle peasant farms were also subjected to taxation by Belders.

This policy was carried out on the basis of the decree of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee of August 17, 1928 "On the confiscation of property of Bai land use." The essence of the content of the reform on labor conscription at work on cleaning the irrigation network "kazu" was reduced to shifting the main burden of work to the bais and ishans. These measures, as well as the cleansing of the entire apparatus of water management from top to bottom, the replacement of "aryk-aksakals" with representatives from the labor force, the poor and the middle peasants, according to the Bolshevik leader of Karakalpakstan P. Varlamov, were supposed to untie the "knot of feudal relations, deal a major blow to the remnants feudalism and put on the path of sovietization the broadest masses of dekhkans" [8]. The results of the study by A. Dzhumashev and S. Nurzhanov show: In the traditional structure of the Karakalpak society, the supremacy of beys, clergy and merchants was natural. They were the organizers and the focus of aul life and played an important role in tribal ties, providing (albeit on enslaving terms) the bulk of the dekhkans with agricultural implements, working livestock, and seed material. Representatives of the clergy who owned waqf property had a special place [9]. In 1928-1929, only 841 rubles were allocated for the restoration of irrigation in the autonomous region. And before that, that is, in 1925-1927, 302,603 rubles were allocated for irrigation [10]. All types of irrigation work - cleaning ditches, building a dam, repairing and kazoos, and new canals, etc. - were carried out in the order of natural duty of the dekhkan masses. In the late 1920s, from 10 to 15 thousand people were involved in irrigation work alone at the expense of bei farms and merchants. This order of irrigation work continued during the period of collectivization and during the years of the five-year plans until the 1950s.

Thus, the "sovietization of water and "kazu" can be characterized as a land and water reform in relation only to the conditions of the Karakalpak Autonomous Region, which was accompanied by the cleansing of the party-Soviet apparatus, raising the role of "belsendi" and "teperish", that is, if we apply modern term, "lumpen-proletariat" aul and village.

In general, it can be stated that the party guidelines of 1927-1928. achieved their goal - the dekhkans of Karakalpakstan were split on the eve of complete collectivization.

Another direction in this struggle was the "cleansing" of the Soviet and party organs. S. Nurzhanov claims that the cleaning of the administrative apparatus in the period from 1927 to 1932. it was planned to be carried out in 2 stages: 1927-1928. and 1929-1932 The main task was to "reveal the face of Karakalpakstan, unravel all the organizational confusion that prevailed in all organizations at that time, and give harmony to all this" [11].

This campaign was carried out in 1928/1929 in one stage and had the character of a fleeting campaign [12].



In September 1929, an uprising broke out in the northern regions of Karakalpakstan. It was quickly suppressed, already on October 10, 1929, at a closed meeting of the Bureau of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, it was decided to organize an exit session of the Supreme Court of the Kazakh ASSR on cases related to "gangster gangs in Karakalpakstan" [13].

In the resolution of the Kazakh Regional Committee dated January 11, 1930, the agricultural regions of Karakalpakstan were specifically designated - Shurakhan, Shabbaz, Ktai-Kipchak, Khodjeyli, Karauzyak, Takhtakupyr, Chimbay, Kungrad. "In these areas, there were the necessary prerequisites for carrying out the" policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, "such as: a high commodity economy, organized laborers and the poor." During the land and water activities, large land plots were identified in the Turtkul region - Nurak Kaneev, Nasrullabay, Ibragim Kazi, Nuraziz Kazakbaev. In Chimbay district, such a list included; Halmurat Begzhanov, Askarbai, Chynykul Hallekov, Kaip Darga, Khanmaksun, Karakum Hazrat, Ibragim Adylov, Kalimbet Bai, Utemurat Bai, Hojimurat Bai, Temirkhan Bai, Tolybai, Tolegen Bai. From Khodjeyli, this list included: Kazakbai Sallah, Jumaniyaz Bai [14]. In general, it was believed that in the Turtkul, Shabbaz, Chimbay and Khodzheyli regions there were at least 100 bais and representatives of the clergy - prosperous households.

Most of all, dekhkans suffered from the barbaric food policy. The authorities borrow grain from the farmer, because they do not have at their disposal goods to exchange for the products they take. This irritates the dekhkans, who have lost hope of ever receiving goods or appropriate compensation. After all, bread and livestock products are the only thing in the village for exchange. Encountering no resistance from the terrorized population, the authorized authorities in choosing punitive measures crossed the boundaries of everything human, turning their actions into mockery and mockery of people. In the memorandum of the commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Grichmanov cites a fact that clearly testifies to the lawlessness that was taking place in the villages of the Chimbay region: "A woman, the widow of the 13th village of the Chimbay region, Bekzada Tursunova, was forced to drag half a batman of corn on her back in a bowl made of pumpkin to the dumping point over a distance of 25 kilometers. And she, holding a baby in her arms, brought the required amount of bread [15].

As a result of repressive measures, 250 households (12 Bai and Ishan, 130 middle peasants, 108 poor peasants) were returned to the Tamdy region from their places of migration. 13 bay farms, 3 middle peasants (including the deputy chairman of the village council) and 2 mullah farms were brought to the administrative-judicial order [16].

At a meeting of the commission of the Karakalpak regional party committee on November 10, 1930, definitions were given for the signs of "semi-feudal and kulak farms" for the daily work of the troika to eliminate the kulak as a class. The definition of the middle peasant farmer was as follows: the sowing rate is 1 tanap per family member; number of livestock: large 4-5, sheep and goats 15-20 heads; inventory omach-1,2, mala -1, arba 1-2, chigirey - 2 pcs. The total number of family members in middle-peasant farms, no matter how large it may be, cannot exceed 10-12 people, therefore the land plot of the middle peasant is limited to 15-18 tanaps.



Middle-peasant households with 15 or more members should be taken under suspicion. The hiring of labor by the middle peasants from outside is permissible 10 days a year.

The category of farmer-farmer, pastoralist included those farms that had other incomes that exceeded the norms of the average farmer's farm - contracts, trade supplies, loans, mills, oil mills, rent, etc. The Baiskoe cattle-breeding farm is a farm with more than 35 heads of livestock (in terms of all animals in terms of cattle). Bai merchants are a farm with a trade turnover of 10 thousand rubles [17].

As early as February 20, 1930, P. Varlamov, at a closed meeting of the Secretariat of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, achieved the following inhumane decision: "to insist on the center to increase the number of evicted from the borders of the KKAO at the expense of those already liquidated on counter-revolutionary cases, terrorist attacks, Basmachism, to instruct the regional department OGPU to submit a personal list for consideration on eviction from the region" [18].

On March 17, 1930, members of the Presidium of the Regional Executive Committee of the KKAO, where Pozdnyakov (acting chairman of the Regional Executive Committee), F. Kholkovsky (Secretary of the Committee of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), Belonogov (Head of the Committee of the OGPU), Kalmenov, Kuzin, Shiganov (respondents of the Regional Executive Committee), supported this decision [19]. The number of evicted households reached 298 units.

The transition to the collectivization of agriculture in the conditions of Karakalpakstan was premature. This action did not have proper conditions and was launched in 1929 without taking into account the qualitative characteristics of both the moral and economic state of the region. In preparing the conditions for collectivization processes, the authorities began to appeal to the ideological aspects of the issue, rather than economic ones. Firstly, they relied on the opinion of the landless part of the population, who could not understand why the work on the equalization of land redistribution was stopped. Back in September 1927, the Presidium of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee, having considered the issue "On land use in South Kazakhstan", decided to immediately clarify "the reasons for the termination of work on the leveling redistribution and begin preparing public opinion for the upcoming land reform" [20]. But, under the conditions of the KAO, the agitation and propaganda work failed: in the speeches of representatives of the districts at a meeting in the regional party committee on November 20, 1928, the opinion was mainly voiced that "almost in all the villages of the Chimbay district, in questions and speeches, a redistribution of land was required, the seizure of the best lands from bais and ishans and transfer them to the poor"[22]. Secondly, the state did not have the necessary financial and logistical capabilities to carry out collectivization measures. They were based only on a simple, mechanical combination of all means and opportunities without taking into account public opinion, relying only on the traditional foundations and nature of relationships in Karakalpak society. Thirdly, the Soviet government launched a progressive attack on the most prosperous strata, exposing them to violence and repression, thereby depriving society of the main core (both ideologically and economically). For example, on January 21, 1930, the Bureau of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the Party decided to finally liquidate the khan's, vaqf and bay lands and evict the largest so-called



"counter-revolutionary elements". On March 17, 1930, the Executive Committee of the Karakalpak Autonomous Region adopted a resolution "On the liquidation of the largest influential semi-feudal lords in the KAO". A wave of monstrous violence also hit Karakalpakstan. Participants of the 1929 resistance movement were subjected to political genocide in the first place. A distribution order was drawn up for the whole autonomous region, and 295 farms were evicted [23].

At the initial stage of the collectivization of agriculture in Karakalpakstan, it was planned to form various associations of farms-land users in the form of artels, communes, partnerships, etc. The collective farm movement in the region began to develop with the beginning of the sowing campaign, and by October 1, 1928, 13 collective farms were formed in the form of agricultural artels and TOZs. Small collective farms of 6-10 members with a total of 28-40 people were mainly the poorest peasantry and farm laborers [24]. In 1928/1929, 568 farms were merged with a coverage of 2096 people and an area of 478 hectares of cotton. In 1929/1930, it was planned to unite 3,051 households with 16,233 people. The chairman of the regional department of the Kolkhoz section, Lepeshkin, testifies that "the higher organizations recognized such a pace as insufficient," and it was proposed to "raise the association higher," i.e. unite 4,084 farms with a population of 21,965 people with land allotment of 16,335 hectares (with cotton planting - 7,257.25 hectares.) [25].

If in 1928 the collective farms included only 200 dekhkans, then in 1932 they already united 29,588 dekhkan farms. The sown area of the collective farms also grew: in 1928, the kolkhozes sowed only 500 hectares, and in 1932 - already 80,234 hectares, the share of the individual sector this year accounted for only one fourth of the entire sown area. Particular attention was paid to the growth of cotton-growing collective farms, for example, the share of cotton-growing collective farms rose to 64% by 1932 against 2.8% in 1928, where the main investment funds were directed. Power structures tried in every possible way to embellish the advantage of collective farms over individual farms. The sown area of cotton has constantly increased: in the collective farms it has increased over the years from 210 to 42,750 hectares. If in 1928 collective farmers removed an average of 5.4 centners per hectare and handed over 1.5 thousand tons of raw cotton to the state, then in 1932 the average yield was 7.5 centners per hectare, and about 30 thousand tons of cotton were handed over to the state raw [26]. Individual farms were subjected to exorbitant taxes and other duties, which, in fact, did not leave them opportunities for self-development and improvement.

Thus, the most difficult years were 1929-1932 - the period of active destruction of the traditional foundations of the Karakalpak society and forcing the pace of collectivization in agriculture of the Karakalpak Autonomous Region. This period included the liquidation of the bais and the clergy as a class with their eviction to other places of residence with the confiscation of property. During this period, there was an active forced involvement of individual farms into collective farms with the socialization of all property property [27].

In the subsequent 1933-1934 years, agriculture did not give the results that were planned to be obtained by the governing bodies and authorities. For example, the III session of the Central Executive Committee of the KKASSR in September 1933 noted that "the Soviets were cut off from the masses and were often limited to bare administration. An asset of collective farmers



and labor dekhkans was not created around them” [28]. At the same time, there were serious shortcomings in the production of agricultural products. For example, in 1933, when cotton was delivered to the state in terms of 39,000 tons, about 28,000 were delivered, which was less than even in 1932 (37,000 tons). In the general context of the development of the situation, in the country as a whole, such a picture can be justified by a complex socio-political characteristic of the processes that led to the decline in production in the agricultural sector. A terrible famine broke out in Kazakhstan and the central part of Russia, which forced most of the population to migrate to Central Asia, including Karakalpakstan. The reason for this situation was the reduction in the number of livestock and agricultural products, the supply of cities worsened, and consumption in rural areas decreased. Added to this was the drought in the summer of 1932, which together led to a complete imbalance of commodity-money relations in the country's economy. Then from Kazakhstan, according to A. Dzhumashev, 3358 farms migrated to the republic. In Karakalpakstan, a ration card system was introduced for employees and workers, and dehkans received alfalfa rations for workdays.

The flood of 1934 caused great damage to agriculture, when 10,220 farms in 8 districts of the republic were subjected to a natural disaster. As a result of the flood, 17955 hectares of crops were flooded, including 6973 hectares of cotton, 5466 collective farms and 2970 households were left homeless. The total damage caused to agriculture amounted to 6630 thousand rubles, the amount of destruction in the irrigation system amounted to 2186 thousand rubles [29].

By 1936, 85.7% of all farms were collectivized, covering 36988 farms, the sown area increased to 120 thousand hectares [30]. The total sown area of collective farms in 1936 was 120,000 hectares. There were 14 MTS in the republic, they were in charge of 745 tractors [31].

In 1936, for the first time in several years, the cotton procurement plan was fulfilled (113.7%), 53,330 tons were handed over to the state instead of the planned 40,655 tons in 1935. There have been some successes in animal husbandry, alfalfa and melon growing.

The socialist reorganization of agriculture gave its results, but it should be noted that the process of collectivization was tragic for the society of the region [32]. The results of forced collectivization in the region were marked by the destruction of the centuries-old tradition of dekhkanism, the struggle against self-sufficient families, the "prosperous", dispossession, persecution of the clergy led to the fragmentation of the Karakalpak village, the pursuit of indicators, expressed itself in its inefficiency. The agricultural reforms of the region in the late 20s and early 30s were reflected in the tragedy of the village.

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